ABSTRACT. The European power grid can be divided into several market areas where the price of electricity is determined in a day-ahead auction. Market participants can provide continuous hourly bid curves and combinatorial bids with associated quantities given the prices. The goal of our auction is to maximize the economic surplus of all participants subject to transmission constraints and the existence of linear prices. In general strict linear prices do not exist in non-convex markets. Therefore we enforce the existence of linear prices where no one incurs a loss and only combinatorial bids might see a not realized gain. The resulting optimization problem is an MPEC that can not be solved efficiently by a standard solver. We present an exact algorithm and a fast heuristic for this type of problem. Both algorithms decompose the MPEC into a master MIP and price subproblems (LPs). The modeling technique and the algorithms are applicable to all MIP based combinatorial auctions.
INTRODUCTION
Energy markets (and in particular electricity markets) in Europe are required to be liberalized due to a directive of the European Union. While this liberalization is a step toward fostering competition, efficient prices, and reduced volatility, new mechanisms have to be put into place to realize this process. In particular markets have to be defined, implemented, and run in order to allow for the trading of energy. In order to guarantee a smoothly running, efficient market the correct market design is imperative. Whereas markets for investment commodities (and investment assets in general) often have a rather simple structure, markets for consumption commodities have to account for the particularities of the traded commodity, in this case electrical power. For example, electrical power can only be stored to a very small amount and energy resulting from overproduction has to be properly disposed of. Both procedures are rather expensive so that under certain circumstances it can be economically feasible that electrical power can have a negative price, i.e., the buyer is paid for buying the electricity. Moreover ramping up and shutting down a power generation facility can take a significant amount of time (several hours up to days) and so energy providers might be discouraged to trade larger amounts of energy due to overproduction resulting from extensive shutdown periods. To counterfeit this trend and to ensure a sufficient market liquidity which is imperative, many electricity markets allow for bids which exhibit a combinatorial structure. For example, an energy provider might be willing to offer a certain amount of electricity in the morning if and only if somebody will also buy the energy that is produced (inevitably due to long shutdown phases) in the afternoon. In the absence of such bids, the energy provider might not have any incentive to offer electricity in the morning as the profit in the morning might be eaten up by the disposal costs in the afternoon resulting in a net loss. These combined bids are executed en bloc. Electricity exchanges (e.g., APX, Belpex, EPEX Spot, Nord Pool Spot AS) implementing these structures have been successfully established since the early 90s.
Markets with such an enhanced structure are commonly referred to as smart markets and clearing is performed by solving the underlying (often combinatorial) optimization problem. In contrast to more mundane market designs that are cleared via order book uncrossing, typically smart markets require a significantly larger amount of computational resources and methods from combinatorial optimization. The electricity market that we consider here is such a smart market given e.g., its block bids and flex bids. Market participants can bid for electricity by submitting bid curves, block bids, and flex bids to their national exchange. These bids specify (for every hour) the quantity (or combinations of those) that the participant is willing to buy or sell for a given market price.
In a consequent next step the regulators additionally suggested a coupling of these liberalized national markets with each other. This international cross-border trading between different electricity markets allows for leveling prices in adjacent market areas leading to overall more efficient markets and removing arbitrage opportunities that could be exploited by energy companies operating in different market areas at the same time. The current regulation on cross-border electricity exchange (cf. EC 1228 (cf. EC /2003 (cf. EC [2003 ) of the European Union enacted in July 2003 requires a market based allocation of transmission capacity of congested cross-border transmission lines. A study (cf. Consentec and Frontier Economics [2004] ) commissioned by the European Commission concludes that the allocation of transfer capacity should be done via an implicit auction.
In this article we present the market design that is currently in use by most of the European electricity exchanges. Basically it is a welfare maximizing combinatorial auction that determines linear clearing prices. Even though the main focus of the paper will be on solving the underlying problem, we also explain why the market model evolved to its current state. Furthermore we will discuss the differences to unit commitment models with nonlinear clearing prices.
The US Market. At first we want to give a short introduction to electricity market clearing models that are used in the US. In the US there exist many Regional Transmission Organization Markets (RTO Markets) . Theses markets are run by Independent System Operators (ISO) who are using unit commitment (UC) models to determine a cost minimal dispatch. A standard reference for unit commitment models is Hobbs et al. [2001] . These models allow for submitting the cost structure and production capacities of each power plant. In particular it is possible to submit startup costs and minimal production capacities which are modeled by using binary variables. This detailed information allows the ISOs to determine a cost minimal commitment of each power plant. Under the assumption that all constraints that describe the unit commitment problem are linear and that no binary variables exist. Then the optimal dispatch can be determined by solving an LP and the prices that support this solution are given by the dual variables. Such prices are called linear prices, because the function that prices the commodity a depending on the quantity q is a linear function ( f a (q) := π a q). As soon as binary variables are involved we have to solve a mixed integer linear program (MIP) and the determination of reasonable prices that support an optimal solution is not as easy as in the LP case. O'Neill et al. [2005] present a pricing scheme that allows us to define prices for a MIP solution. The main idea is, that we have to add the binary actions to the commodity space. Then we can find linear prices for all commodities, including the binary actions. There already exist auctions that are using similar pricing schemes, for example the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) and the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection (PJM) . Even though we could use a similar approach for the European market the participants would not accept the prices as they are discriminatory: every participant who submits a combinatorial bid would receive or pay an individual side payment and the auctioneer would keep the entire economic surplus generated by the combinatorial bids (cf., Appendix A). Another technique that allows us to define prices for a MIP solution is called convex hull pricing (Gribik et al. [2007] , Wang et al. [2011] ). This pricing scheme reduces the impact of side payments but still requires the use of individual side payments yielding discriminatory prices.
The European Market. Similar to the US there exist several regional Transmission System Operators 1 (TSO) in Europe. The main difference to the ISOs in the US is, that the European TSOs only maintain system feasibility and reliability. They do not control the spot market for electricity, but they determine network boundary conditions within which they can guarantee the system feasibility and reliability. So the boundary conditions (e.g., available transmission capacities) are submitted to independent power exchanges 2 who will run the financial spot market auctions subject to the network constraints. On top of these power exchanges a market coupling system 3 collects all order book data from the exchanges and network constraints from the TSOs and computes economically efficient power flows between the power exchanges. These flows and price signals are submitted back to the exchanges and TSOs. Finally the exchanges run their own auction incorporating the cross-border flow signals and the price signals.
All power exchanges that we consider here determine linear nondiscriminatory clearing prices for their specific bidding area. This implies that the market coupling system must also determine linear nondiscriminatory clearing prices, and thus we can not use a pricing scheme that is similar to the one proposed in O'Neill et al. [2005] . We have to satisfy the pricing rules that are given by the exchanges. As of now, the TSOs do not submit flow based network constraints (PTDF-matrices). They only submit upper and lower bounds for the flows and ramping conditions. This is due to the fact that the coupling algorithms used within the Nordpool Spot region and the CASC-CWE region do not use PTDFs yet. Therefore a market coupling system that couples these two regions cannot incorporate PTDFs, however the algorithms that we present can be easily adjusted to solve a flow based market coupling problem.
The electricity market design that we consider here is based on Kirschen and Strbac [2004] and Hogan [1998] . It uses bid curves representing the marginal cost of production and the marginal benefit of consumption and prices the congestion of network branches. It is known that under certain circumstances this market design might be exploited by strategic bidders (cf. Woo et al. [2003] ) and there are even indications that this might have been the case at the German electricity exchange EEX (cf. Canty [2009] ). Whereas this might be a real-world issue that has to be addressed by regulators, we assume a smoothly functioning market as our focus is a different one. There exist several articles addressing the particular issues of clearing energy markets however with different models: Most of the models either do not contain binary decision variables or they use a nonlinear pricing scheme. For example, the model introduced in Kirschen and Strbac [2004] considers only a single time slot and only continuous hourly bid curves. While this fundamental approach provides a very nice illustration of the equilibrium conditions and security constraints it does not provide a solution approach in the presence of combinatorial structures. The approach in Haubrich et al. [2006] is a market coupling model with step functions as bid curves and without the fill-or-kill condition of block bids, i.e., block bids can be partially executed in this model. The resulting model is a linear program that can be solved by any standard solver. The most difficult part however, the ensuring of the fill-or-kill condition in combination with linear prices is not addressed by this approach. On the one hand introducing the fill-or-kill condition will include knapsack problems leading to NP-hard optimization problems. On the other hand the inclusion of binary variables enforces us to manually ensure the existence of linear prices. This is done by adding additional optimality conditions to the constraints. The resulting model will be a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC). It is very difficult to handle these complementarity conditions in conjunction with the binary decision variables. The preliminary approach presented in Krion [2008] handled the fill-or-kill conditions as well as the existence of linear prices with respect to the three basic bid types. Therefore the bid curves where modeled by the delta method with the help of additional binary variables. However the complementarity conditions of cross-border-trades where not included in this preliminary model such that the fill-or-kill conditions could cause adverse flows from 1 TSOs within the considered market: Amprion, CASC-CWE, elia, EnBW, Energinet.dk, Fingrid, 50hertz transmission, Rte, Statnett, Svenska Kraftnät, Tennet, Transpower, ... further European TSOs can be found at www.entsoe.eu 2 Power exchanges within the considered market: APX, Belpex, EPEX Spot, Nordpool Spot 3 In our case the system is run by European Market Coupling Company (EMCC) a high price area to a low price area. The stakeholders decided that adverse flows may only be caused by transmission constraints. This requirement was added to the model by using a heuristic (see [EMCC GmbH, Chapter 4.3.2] and Section 7 for details).
Our contribution. In this article we use the market model currently used by European electricity exchanges. The presented model is compliant with the European regulatory framework and approved by the regulator. The European market model differs from common US RTO market models that are using nonlinear pricing schemes. The model incorporates binary decision variables and guarantees the existence of nondiscriminatory linear clearing prices. The existence of linear clearing prices is enforced by complementarity conditions yielding a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC). We present a deterministic algorithm yielding a provably optimal solution and a fast heuristic that exploits the model structure. Instead of solving the complicated MPEC directly we decompose it into a Mixed Integer Quadratic Program (MIQP) and a linear pricing problem. Empirical tests suggest that the solutions determined by the heuristic are optimal in many cases. We also ensure unique prices without changing the economic surplus. Additionally, we introduce rules that allow market participants to check whether the determined prices satisfy necessary optimality conditions.
Outline. The structure of the article is as follows. In Section 2 we give a brief introduction to the European electricity market and its features. In Section 3 we introduce the combinatorial optimization problem that is used to determine optimal flows and efficient prices. Analyzing this model we obtain optimality conditions which are formulated in Section 4. We then establish in Section 5 the uniqueness of prices and then we formulate a clearing heuristic and an optimal algorithm in Section 6. We conclude with some computational results in Section 7 and some final remarks in Section 8.
PRELIMINARIES
In the following section we recall the structure of the electricity markets and its features. We also introduce the necessary notions and notations. We first explain the electricity market related terminology and then, in the second part, we will introduce the notation that we will use later.
European market design. The design of the day-ahead electricity market that we consider here is an extension of the designs of Kirschen and Strbac [2004] and Haubrich et al. [2006] and meets the needs of Central West European Market Coupling Project (CWE MC) and Nord Pool Spot AS (NPS). Nonetheless the model can be easily adapted to account for particularities of other electricity exchanges, if the regulatory boundary conditions are similar to the European regulatory conditions.
In a day-ahead energy market participants bid today for electricity that is being bought or sold on the following day. In fact, participants bid for electricity in specific time slots on the next day. In a coupled day-ahead electricity market, the participants can bid for electricity in and across certain market areas. The participants are allowed to submit their bids up to a predetermined point in time. We basically differentiate between three types of bids that will be explained in more detail later. The first type is an hourly bid curve where the participant determines the amount of energy that he is willing to buy or sell given a certain price. The second type of bid are so called block bids. Using this type of bid the participant can bid for block structures of energy, e.g., selling a certain amount of energy in the morning and a certain amount of energy in the evening. These bids have a fill-or-kill character as they can only be executed as a whole and exactly this type of bid introduces combinatorial features into the market. The last type of bids are so called flexible bids (short: flex bids). These bids allow for selling a certain amount of electricity in exactly one time slot. The actual slot in which this takes place is not specified. All bids are valid for specific time slots (except for flex bids) and specific market areas. As soon as the submission deadline has passed the auction algorithm has to determine an optimal matching of buyers and sellers, determine efficient prices for each market area and each time slot, and compute the optimal cross-border flows between adjacent market areas. The determined price reflects the price for FIGURE 2.1. Modeling of the hourly net curves and the economic surplus. one electrical power unit that is delivered throughout the specified time slot. Although these prices are only valid for those bids that were cleared by the auction algorithm, they do also serve the purpose of being price signals for the intraday electricity market.
In order to refer to a specific area we write a ∈ A where A denotes the set of areas and similarly we write t ∈ T to refer to a specific time slot where T denotes the set of time slots; here hours of the day. The price in area a ∈ A at time t ∈ T will be denoted by π a,t ∈ [p, p] where [p, p] denotes the feasible price interval with p ≤ p. We now define the types of bids in a more formal way that suits the later exposition. In the following we will consider aggregated demand and supply curves without loss of generality.
Hourly demand and supply curve. Participants can submit an hourly bid curve for every hour and area to specify the feasible quantities that will be bought or sold depending on the price. These curves are piecewise linear, monotonically decreasing, and are defined on [p, p] . Positive quantities correspond to electricity that is bought. To determine the surplus and the prices it is sufficient to regard only one aggregated hourly sell and one hourly buy curve per area and hour as we do not discriminate between different buyers or sellers. We can further aggregate these buy and sell curves to one combined hourly net demand curve per area and hour (see e.g., Figure 2 .1). The net curves contain all necessary information to maximize the economic surplus and to determine efficient prices (see e.g., Meeus et al. [2005] ) on the one hand and facilitates the actual market clearing on the other hand. It is easy to see that the hourly net curves are also piecewise linear and monotonically decreasing. We refer to H ⊂ 0 as the set of segments. Each segment h ∈ H a,t ⊆ H is attributed to a market area a and a time slot t and its execution state is modeled by the continuous variable δ h ∈ [0, 1].
Block bids. Block bids enable traders to buy or sell electricity for several (not necessarily consecutive) hour slots with a single bid. We denote the set of block bids by B. Block bids can only be executed as a whole (fill-or-kill condition) and the price determined for executing a block bid b ∈ B will be the weighted average of the prices of electricity in the corresponding areas weighted by the traded quantities. Note that even if the determined prices seem to allow the execution of a block bid it might not be executed as the execution could imply a loss of economic surplus or the execution could change the prices, so that this block or other blocks cannot be executed. These blocks are called paradoxically rejected blocks. Whether or not a block bid is executed will be denoted by the binary variables β b with b ∈ B. As we will see later, finding the optimal block bid selection is the most difficult task faced Flex bids. With flex bids a trader can buy or sell electricity in exactly on hour without specifying the hour in which the bid has to be executed. A buy bid can be executed in an hour where the clearing price is lower than or equal to the bid price (and similarly for selling electricity). Flexible bids must satisfy the fill-or-kill condition as well. We refer to the set of flex bids by F and for each f ∈ F we have binary variables ϕ f ,t with t ∈ T . These variables will be used to determine when a flex bid is executed.
Cross-border trades. Trading electricity across areas is called a cross-border trade. The cross-border trader acts as a consumer in one and as supplier in another area. Cross-border trades are only possible if there are interconnectors connecting the areas. The latter will be denoted by C and the transmitted electricity will be denoted by τ c,t with c ∈ C and t ∈ T . These interconnectors have limited transmission capacities so that capacity cannot be allocated arbitrarily. In an implicit capacity allocation, there is only one cross-border-trader per interconnector and the transmission quantity will be determined by a market coupling system with aim to maximize the economic surplus. In this setting traders cannot directly trade across market segments: the cross-border trader at the involved interconnector determines the execution quantities by maximizing the total economic surplus. Note that also the surplus of the cross-border trader, the so called congestion rent, is part of the economic surplus.
Notation and definitions.
For the ease of presentation we now introduce and summarize the notation that we will use in the remainder of the article.
Sets.
The following sets are used in the model:
nodes of all hourly net demand curves H a,t ⊂ H nodes of hourly net demand curve in area a, hour t S ⊂ H curtailment segments of hourly net demand curves B block bids B a ⊂ B block bids in area a F flexible bids
Variables. We use the following variables in the optimization problem:
partial execution of the hourly net demand curve segment
τ c,t ≥ 0 denotes a flow from r to s at time t Parameters. We now introduce the parameters that we use in the optimization model. The parameters used in the optimization model are dimensionless. In the actual implementation quantities are given in megawatt (MW) and prices are denoted in Euro/MW. A positive quantity denotes a demand whereas a negative one indicates supply. All submitted price limits are required to be in the price interval AS, 2011, Section 2.3] . This implies that we can find prices within this interval, thus the constraint π a,t ∈ P is not a restriction.
Parameters of block bids. Let b ∈ B a be a block bid in area a ∈ A. Then q b,t ∈ denotes the quantity in hour t ∈ T and p b ∈ P denotes the average limit price.
The average limit price p b is the average price, weighted by the traded quantities. More precisely, the block bid b can only be executed if the trader can realize a net profit, i.e., t∈T
Parameters for linking block bids. Let b ∈ B and c ∈ B be block bids. The set L ⊆ B × B denotes the links between block bids. If (b, c) ∈ L, then b can only be executed if also c is executed.
Parameters of flexible bids. Let f ∈ F a be a flexible bid in area a ∈ A. Then q f ∈ denotes the quantity and p f ∈ P denotes the limit price.
The flexible bid f can be executed in exactly one hour t ∈ T if the trader can realize a profit when
Parameters of interconnectors.
Let c = (r, s) ∈ C be an interconnector and let t ∈ T . The interconnector is a directed edge, whereas r denotes the source and s denotes the sink. Nonetheless, the actual transfer on this edge is bidirectional and the transfer direction is signified by the sign of τ c,t . We use the convention that a negative τ c,t indicates transmitted electricity against the direction of the edge, i.e., from s to r. Furthermore, the volume transmitted via an interconnector might not be allowed to change too much between two periods. The allowed absolute difference (between consecutive slots) is the ramp rate. There are also upper and lower bounds on the transmission quantity called available transfer capacities (ATC). We write We put τ c = ∞ if we have no ramping on c.
Parameters of hourly net demand curves. We consider one aggregated hourly net demand curve per area a and time t. An hourly net curve is a piecewise linear function in 2 consisting of (price,quantity) tuples. We require that the function is monotonically decreasing, i.e, whenever we have two feasible tuples (p 1 , q 1 ), (p 2 , q 2 ) with p 1 ≤ p 2 then q 1 ≥ q 2 holds. This condition ensures that the net curve is well defined, i.e., for an increasing price the net demand decreases (not necessarily strictly). Every point of the curve represents a feasible (price,quantity) combination and as a whole they constitute the feasible price range depending on the traded quantity.
Let h ∈ H a,t be a defining node of an hourly net curve in area a at time t. Then
denotes the minimum net demand quantity, p h ∈ P denotes the price coordinate of the node, q h ∈ denotes the quantity coordinate of the node,
denotes the price difference to the next node,
denotes the quantity difference to the next node.
The hourly net curve must intersect the price axis and has to be defined on the entire feasible price interval P. If the net curve has no intersection with the price axis, then a vertical segment is added, that connects the price axis with the curve. 4 This segment models the curtailment of hourly bids and is added to the list of curtailment segments S. Effectively, it sets a maximum price for which electricity might be bought. An example of a net curve arising from a demand and a supply curve are depicted in Figures 2.1 and 3.1. It is possible that quantity or price do not change over consecutive intervals. Without loss of generality we assume that the function remains constant only over exactly one interval at a time, i.e., there are no three tuples (p 1 , q 1 ), (p 2 , q 2 ), and (p 3 , q 3 ) with either p 1 ≤ p 2 ≤ p 3 and q 1 = q 2 = q 3 or q 1 ≥ q 2 ≥ q 3 and p 1 = p 2 = p 3 ; in this case we could simply drop (p 2 , q 2 ). This assumption simplifies some proofs on the one hand and, when used within the preprocessing, speeds up the solution process on the other hand.
MODEL
In this section we will present the complete MPEC that models our clearing problem. We first introduce the overall model structure and then discuss each constraint as well as the objective function in detail.
Note that the price conditions contain complementarity conditions. The variables ρ, µ, and v are dual variables of the individual optimization problems of price takers. As the complete model incorporates the individual optimization problems, these variables are primal variables in the MPEC. We need to explicitly add the price conditions to the model, because they can not be fulfilled in general if they are not included in the model. The main idea of the model is to define prices that are consistent with the dual prices that we know from continuous models: Assume that we solve a model, that only contains the quantity constraints (except for constraint (C 3)) and that the model has the integral property. Then we can find dual prices to an optimal primal solution that satisfy the price conditions. In this case, the price conditions could be added to the model, without cutting of any optimal solution. This assertion can be verified by writing down the KKT conditions of the QP-relaxation.
3.1. Constraints. We now introduce the constraints mentioned above and provide justification and interpretation of those. C 1. clearing condition. This constraints ensures the identity of executed net demand and net import. The constraint is similar to the classical conservation of flow constraint typically present in network flow models. In every area and every hour the executed net demand must coincide with the net import:
C 2. ramping condition. This ramping condition incorporates the ramping requirements on the interconnectors by limiting the change between two consecutive time intervals accordingly. From one hour to the next hour the flow on interconnector c may only change by τ c units: 
C 4. flexible bid execution at most once. A flex bid f can only be executed once in one specific time slot:
C 5. block price condition. This constraint ensures that our block selection strategy is incentive compatible. In principle it is possible to obtain an equally high or even higher economic surplus by requiring altruistic behavior from some of the participants. However this is not in line with general economic principles as no participant is willing to sell at a loss. Therefore, a block bid can only be executed if it does not generate a net loss:
This is a quadratic non-convex function that is difficult to handle, but it is easy to linearize it if we introduce a big constant M b for each b ∈ B. We know that β b is a binary variable and we know that p ∈ [p, p]. Now we can rewrite the constraint as follows:
C 6. flexible bid price condition. Moreover, the execution of a flex bid is contingent on economic compatibility. More precisely, a flex bid is only executed if it does not generate a loss:
where sgn(.) denotes the sign function.
C 7. flow price condition. This condition represents the optimality condition of the cross-border traders optimization problem. The regulators force them to be price takers such that the prices are externally given and the only remaining decision variable is the flow τ c,t . The individual optimization problem is to maximize the congestion rent subject to the available transmission capacity and the ramp rate:
Basically an optimal flow implies that there may only be a price difference between two adjacent areas if at least one transmission constraint is active. In other words, the prices of adjacent areas coincide, if there is free transmission capacity between those areas. From now on the KKT-conditions of (LP-TSO) will be called the flow price condition. 
In terms of duality theory the conditions (3.1) and (3.2) correspond to dual feasibility conditions and the remaining ones are complementarity conditions. The term in square brackets is only added if t + 1 ∈ T .
If there is no ramping on an interconnector c = (r, s), this condition simplifies to
The economic interpretation of this simplified condition is that free transfer capacity in the forward direction implies that the price π r,t in the source area must be higher or equal to the price π s,t in the sink area. If this would not be the case, then the free capacity should be used to transfer electricity from the source to the sink, and therefore the market would not be in an equilibrium. If, on the other hand, the ramping condition (C 2) on an interconnector c = (r, s) is only binding (i.e., satisfied with equality) in two consecutive hours t and t + 1, and there is still available transfer capacity in that time window, then the condition simplifies to:
(3.8) 5 A derivation of the equations (3.7) to (3.10) can be found in Appendix B.
This establishes that the price difference at one point in time can have an impact on the price difference in the following ones. The condition also implies, that prices of adjacent areas can only deviate if at least one respective transmission constraint is active. In particular it is sufficient, that in one hour the transmission is limited only by the ramping condition and not by the available transmission capacities to trigger a price difference. It holds (terms in square brackets are only present if t + 1 ∈ T ):
(3.10) C 8. filling condition of hourly net curves. This constraint represents the optimality conditions of an hourly bid. Participants who submit hourly bids are modeled as price takers. In the optimization problem associated with an hourly bid h the price is exogenously given and the only remaining decision variable is δ h . The objective is to maximize the economic surplus. In the next chapter we will explain the following integral in more detail.
From now on the KKT conditions of this optimization problem will be called filling condition. 
This condition can be reformulated to an equivalent condition: 
The second definition directly shows that an optimal solution only contains quantity-pricecombinations (δ, π) that were defined by the piecewise linear bid curves. A MIP formulation of the filling condition based on the delta-method (cf. Dantzig [1998] ) can be found in Appendix C and a graphical illustration is given in Figure 2 .1.
For the sake of completeness we want to list two further constraints that are relevant in extreme situations but will not be handled by the model (MPEC). We omitted these constraints so that we can focus on the constraints listed beforehand. FIGURE 3.1. Extending hourly net curve from small price interval P a to P. Remark 1. Combinatorial bid curtailment. This constraint is a market rule requested by the exchanges to improve the system stability: In curtailment situations price indifferent hourly bids have a higher priority than combinatorial bids. If the hourly net demand is curtailed in area a at time t, then combinatorial bids with demand in area a, time t will also be curtailed (i.e., they must not be executed). Similarly this should hold for curtailed supply. The set of net curve segments that represent the curtailment is denoted by S. We have the following condition:
Supply curtailment: , 3000] B C/MW. Suppose that the feasible price interval P a of area a is a proper subset of P. In this case the hourly net curve is a priori only defined on P a . We therefore need to extend the curve to cover the whole price interval P and to ensure the existence of prices with the above mentioned properties in P. This is done by extending the curve in a horizontal manner. If the curve has no intersection with the price axis, i.e., the maximum supply does not cover the minimum demand or vice versa, then the curve is extended in a vertical manner at first to create an intersection with the price axis. This vertical segment is called curtailment segment and will be stored in the set S ⊂ H. An example is shown in Figure 3 .1 where the extension is indicated by the dotted lines. If a solution contains a price π a,t / ∈ P a , then π a,t is changed to the nearest price in P a . By doing so, we might violate the flow price condition. In other words, there might be a price difference between two adjacent areas although none of the transport restrictions is binding. In fact, this might happen if one of the areas has a small price interval and reaches the maximal possible hourly demand or supply.
3.2. Objective Function. The economic surplus is the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus (cf. Pindyck and Rubinfeld [2005] ). It is also called global welfare (cf. Kirschen and Strbac [2004] ) or social welfare. For example a consumer buys q units at a price of π per unit and he is willing to pay a price of p > π, then his consumer surplus is given by (p − π)q. The producer surplus generated by hourly bid curves is determined accordingly by integrating the clearing price minus the producers cost over the quantity from zero to the produced quantity. As we are only interested in the maximization of the economic surplus, it is sufficient to compute the economic surplus of the hourly net demand curve and the other market products instead of using the hourly demand and supply curves.
We will now define the surplus of each market product. These definitions are consistent with the above mentioned one. Beforehand we define the incremental price and quantity functions in a more FIGURE 3.2. Economic surplus of an hourly net curve segment. precise way. These functions correspond to the linear interpolation between two consecutive defining nodes.
Definition 3.4. For area a ∈ A, hour t ∈ T , and segment h ∈ H a,t , the net curve segment functions
Note, that if ∆q h = 0, then the inverse supply/demand function is given by p h (q
is the net quantity that is contributed by the segment h. With this definition we can define the surplus for net curve segments and hence for the whole curve by additivity.
Definition 3.5. The surplus of a non-horizontal net curve segment h ∈ H a,t in area a and hour t with ∆q h = 0 is given by
(3.14)
Note that the last term in Equation 3.14 is a constant. Horizontal segments do not generate a surplus, as they only represent a synthetic bid with quantity zero: For h ∈ H with ∆q
Expression (3.14) is equivalent to the net consumers/producers surplus in [Kirschen and Strbac, 2004, Chapter 2.2] .
Note that the surplus for the net curve corresponds to the area between the curve and the price axis. Examples are provided in Figures 2.1 and 3.2. Next we define the surplus for the combinatorial structures, i.e., the block and flex bids. Definition 3.6. The surplus of a block bid b ∈ B a with a ∈ A for π ∈ P A×T and β ∈ {0, 1} B is given by
Definition 3.7. The surplus of a flexible bid f ∈ F a with a ∈ A for π ∈ A×T and ϕ ∈ {0, 1} F ×T is given by
Another surplus arises on the interconnectors. This surplus represents the surplus of cross-border trades and is usually referred to as congestion rent.
Definition 3.8. The congestion rent on interconnector c = (r, s) ∈ C at time t ∈ T is given for π ∈
A×T and τ ∈ C×T by:
Note that the congestion rent is indeed contained in the economic surplus in most market models run today. The surplus generated due to congestion rent is usually reinvested in order to reduce tariffs or build new lines 6 . We will see later that the flows are not uniquely determined by the maximal economic surplus, but in general ambiguities only exist, when prices of adjacent areas coincide. In these situations, there is no price difference (π s,t − π r,t ) and thus no congestion rent, and the congestion rent cannot be influenced by changing the flow τ c,t within the ambiguities. For more details on ambiguities of flows and how to choose unique flows refer to Section 5.3.
Definition 3.9. Let (π, β, ϕ, δ, τ) be feasible for (MPEC). The economic surplus of the market is the sum of the surpluses of all market participants and is computed as follows:
We will now show how the objective function can be simplified given condition (C 1). The simplified expression of the economic surplus is equivalent to the objective of the welfare maximization problem in [Niu et al., 2005 , Section II.B].
Theorem 3.10. Let (π, β, ϕ, δ, τ) be within the given bounds and satisfy condition (C 1), then the economic surplus is given by
where K is a constant. Observe that the objective function obtained in Theorem 3.10 is a quadratic, concave function and does not involve price variables π or flow variables τ. While this is convenient for the actual computation, these variables still have to satisfy the stated conditions and so they implicitly influence the economic surplus.
Proof. By construction we have
The problem formulation (MPEC) with the objective function as stated above is in principle solvable by convex Mixed-Integer Quadratic Programming solvers like IBM CPLEX if we linearize the price conditions by using the big-M method. Solving real world instances with this technique however is very hard, because each nonlinear price constraint must be modeled by using an auxiliary binary variable. For the considered instances we were not able to obtain feasible solutions or improve provided warmstart solutions within 30 minutes. This is clearly unsatisfactory as the actual market coupling auction needs to be cleared within 10 minutes. We therefore propose a heuristic and a specialized optimization algorithm for this problem. We did not yet try to solve the MPEC by using MINLP solvers like BARON or BONMIN, or general MIQP solvers like SCIP however we believe that due to the problem structure the presented problem specific approach will outperform general purpose solvers.
OPTIMALITY CONDITIONS
In this section we define a relaxation of (MPEC) and analyze the optimality conditions of this problem. Based on this analysis we derive a heuristic that performs very well in practice. We say that (β * , ϕ * ) is a bid selection if β * ∈ {0, 1} B and ϕ * ∈ {0, 1} F ×T . Note that a bid selection does not necessarily satisfy the condition that none of the chosen bids should incur a loss.
We consider the following relaxation of (MPEC) given a fixed bid selection (β * , ϕ * ):
Note that (QPRelax) arises from (MPEC) by dropping the combinatorial structure, i.e., block bids and the flex bids. In this case we do not need to require the filling condition (C 8) or the flow price condition (C 7) explicitly as these naturally follows from the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions (cf. [Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004, Chapter 5.5.3] ). The next theorem shows how an optimal solution to (QPRelax) can be extended to a feasible solution of (MPEC). Proof. Let (β * , ϕ * ) be a bid selection and let (δ * , τ * ) be a maximum solution of (QPRelax). As ω is continuous differentiable and the constraints are linear, optimal solutions to (QPRelax) have to satisfy the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions: There exist variables π, v, v, µ, µ, ρ, ρ with v, v, µ, µ, ρ, ρ ≥ 0 (4.1)
where the term in brackets is only added if t + 1 ∈ T . The conditions (4.1) to (4.3) are the dual feasibility conditions and conditions (4.4) to (4.9) are the complementarity conditions. Observe that equations (4.1), (4.3), and (4.6) to (4.9) imply that (τ * , π) fulfills the flow price condition (C 7). The filling condition (C 8) can be derived from the equations (4.1), (4.2), and (4.4) to (4.5). For this we consider three cases. Let a ∈ A, t ∈ T , and h ∈ H a,t with ∆q h = 0. In the first case, let δ * h ) + π a,t ≥ 0. Therefore (δ * , π) satisfies the filling condition.
For the last statement of the theorem, let f and g a,t be as above. As (δ * , τ * , β * , ϕ * ) satisfies constraint (C 1) we can apply Theorem 3.10 and obtain that the economic surplus is given by ω(δ * , τ * ).
Observe that f and k a,t in the proof above correspond to the contribution to the welfare (not necessarily positive) and the additional volume generated by the bid selection. We will later use Theorem 4.1 to extend solutions to (QPRelax) together with a bid selection to feasible ones for (MPEC).
UNIQUENESS OF A SOLUTION
In the following section we will discuss uniqueness aspects of the computed solution. More precisely, we will show that the economic surplus for a given bid selection is unique. The prices however do not necessarily be unique as we will see.
Let
. If π are prices so that (δ, π) satisfies the filling condition and (τ, π) satisfies the flow price condition, then we say that p are shadow prices for (δ, τ).
5.1. Unique economic surplus for a given bid selection. Recall that the model (MPEC) requires the filling condition and the flow price condition to be satisfied. We can therefore only construct a solution to (MPEC) from a solution to (QPRelax) if the solution satisfies the filling and the flow price condition. Fortunately, these are induced by the KKT optimality conditions of (QPRelax). Therefore every solution of (QPRelax) for which shadow prices exist is optimal for (QPRelax). As there exists exactly one optimal objective value per bid selection, there exists exactly one economic surplus per bid selection. An optimal solution to (QPRelax) is unique with respect to δ I , as ω is strictly concave with respect to δ I (cf. Dattorro [2005] ).
5.3.
Choosing unique flows. The constraints in Section 3.1 and the optimality of a solution to (QPRelax) are not sufficient to imply a unique flow. This follows from the fact that even some of the vertical segments (i.e., those with ∆p h = 0) of hourly bids are not unique. To obtain a unique flow, we minimize the squared flow while fixing the economic surplus. In Figure 5 .1 an example of a non-unique flow is depicted. The left part shows the solution with minimized squared flows.
The following model selects a unique flow: Let (β * , ϕ * ) be a bid selection, (δ * , τ * ) be an optimal solution to (QPRelax), and let J ⊂ h ∈ H | ∆q h = 0 and ∆p h = 0 be the set of non-unique vertical segments. 
Upper bounds, lower bounds, and ramp rate:
Note that the objective is strictly convex and the constraints are affine linear. So the obtained solution is unique with respect to the flow. The unique flow determines a unique net export per area and hour, therefore also the execution of vertical segments of the net curves is unique.
It is easy to see, that ambiguities of the flow can arise in situations where the prices of adjacent areas coincide. As mentioned above there is no congestion rent in these situations. Our hypothesis is, that whenever there are flow ambiguities the prices of the involved areas coincide or can be chosen, so that they coincide. 5.4. Choosing unique prices. We will explain an easy way of how to obtain unique prices. Let (β * , ϕ * ) be a bid selection, (δ * , τ * ) be an optimal solution to (QPRelax) with unique flows, and π be shadow prices. If in a specific area, in some time slot the net curve is horizontal (i.e., no volume change) at the clearing price, then the price can be chosen freely within the price indifferent price range without affecting the economic surplus (provided that the price does not violate any other constraint). We therefore propose, as above in the case of flows, to minimize the squared prices in order to determine unique shadow prices. 
executed flexible bids must not incur a loss:
Observe that the filling condition, the flow price condition, and the bid price constraints simplify to linear constraints, because the flow τ * , the hourly bid execution δ * , and the bid selection (β * , ϕ * ) are fixed.
THE BID CUT ALGORITHMS
We will now present the proposed algorithm to solve the clearing problem. The basic idea is to relax all price constraints. For example we allow that block or flex bids incur a loss. The natural spot price characteristics (see Theorem 4.1) guarantee the existence of shadow prices for an optimum solution of the following relaxation:
(C 1): clearing condition (C 2): ramp rates (C 3): block bid links (C 4): flexible bid execution Proof. Let (β * , ϕ * , δ * , τ * ) be optimal for (QPBidCut). Then (β * , ϕ * ) represents a bid selection and (δ * , τ * ) is optimal for (QPRelax). With Theorem 4.1 the existence of shadow prices is guaranteed and the objective value is the economic surplus.
Note that the theorem above only guarantees the existence of shadow prices, but does not guarantee that none of the executed block bids incurs a loss.
Suppose now that we have an optimal solution to (QPBidCut) and the associated shadow prices. Then there might be block or flexible bids that incur a loss. Thus the solution is not valid for (MPEC). In this case an additional constraint, a so called bid cut, is added to the problem. This constraint cuts off the invalid bid selection and a class of similar bid selections. This process is repeated until a selection is found that is valid for (MPEC). Shadow prices for a solution to (QPBidCut) can be computed with the model (QPPrice), whereas the bid price constraints need to be relaxed to make (QPPrice) always feasible. This can be done for example by introducing positive continuous variables λ b for every executed combinatorial bid b and adding λ b to the left side of the according bid price constraint. Then we add all these variables to the objective function, so that they get minimized. Now the variable λ b models the loss of the executed combinatorial bid b.
We will now introduce two families of cuts that can be used. The first one works very well in practice but is slightly inexact as it might converge to a slightly suboptimal solution. The second family of cuts is exact but more cuts have to be added. We will later report timings for both families in Section 7. 
We refer to this class of constraints as Bid Cuts (cf. [Müller, 2009, Definition 5.2 
]).
As mentioned above, for this family of cuts, the obtained solution might be slightly suboptimal, i.e., these cuts provide us with a heuristic. Nonetheless, this heuristic can be used iteratively as shown in Algorithm 6.1 or it can be incorporated into a branch-and-cut framework. The latter is the more effective one as it provides us with an exact solution algorithm.
If the Bid Cut is replaced with a less aggressive one that only removes exactly one invalid bid selection, then the resulting algorithm will converge to the globally optimal solution. This Branch-And-Cut Decomposition, works, for example, with the following family of cuts that separate exactly one invalid bid selection.
be a solution of (QPBidCut). Then following inequality cuts off the bid selection (β * , ϕ * ):
We refer to this class of constraints as no-good cuts (cf. [Müller, 2009, Theorem 5.4 ], Chu and Xia [2004] ).
Note that the combinatorial bid curtailment (Remark 1) must be ensured in a similar way. We cannot add it directly to the (QPBidCut)-model, as it would affect the properties of an optimal solution.
Algorithm 6.1 Iterative Bid Cut Heuristic
Input: An instance of the model (QPBidCut)
RESULTS
We will now present some computational results for the algorithms presented in Section 6. We compare the Bid Cut Heuristic and Branch-and-Cut Decomposition to the commercial algorithm EMCC Optimizer of Deutsche Börse Systems which is currently used by European Market Coupling Company (EMCC) to determine flows between Denmark (Nord Pool Spot AS) and Germany (EPEX Spot).
For our computational tests we used 79 realistic instances, that contain 10 European market areas, about 600 combinatorial bids, and about 31.700 defining net curve nodes. All tests were performed on the same hardware 7 using IBM CPLEX 12.1 as mixed integer linear/quadratic programming solver. In our tests, we did not incorporate the (FixFlow) model, as its sole purpose is the redistribution of flow without affecting the overall economic surplus. Moreover, our tests indicated that fixing the flow impacts the prices only in very pathological cases that can usually be disregarded. We will first give a brief introduction to the current version of the EMCC Optimizer and provide some statistics. Then we discuss the two proposed algorithms from above.
EMCC Optimizer. The version of the EMCC Optimizer that we used in our comparison is version 2.1.2 (in use since 09.11.2009 ). This algorithm is based on computing a start solution with a linear program (cf. Krion [2008] ) and then checking the feasibility of the bid selection. If the bid selection is not feasible, executed bids are excluded successively until the solution is feasible. Then the solution will be improved by trying to include not executed bids. For more details see [EMCC GmbH, Chapter 4.3.2] . In some cases this search phase is very time consuming and cannot be completed within 10 minutes 8 . In this case, the last feasible solution will be returned; in fact the start solution for the last phase is already 7 Intel Xeon Core E5440 with 8 GB memory 8 The limit of 10 minutes reflected the operational requirements when the tests of this algorithm were performed (September 2009). For production it has been changed to 15 minutes. feasible however might be suboptimal. In our analysis, for 22% of the instances this last heuristic phase could not be completed on time. The average time for computing clearing prices was 6 minutes and in at least 15% of the cases the bid selection was optimal. In 76% of the cases the selections could be slightly improved by our algorithms and in the remaining cases we could neither prove nor disprove the optimality of the selection. The relative distance to the best upper bound, i.e., the relative gap, averages to 2.577×10 −6 ; a selection is considered optimal here if the gap is below 1×10 −12 which roughly corresponds to one euro cent. On average there are 10.76 rejected combinatorial bids, so called paradoxically rejected bids (PRB) (cf. Meeus et al. [2009] ), that could potentially have generated a net profit. However, in most cases these bids cannot be included without decreasing the overall economic surplus or rejecting other bids that are in the money.
Bid Cut Heuristic.
The tests are based on a branch-and-cut version of the Bid Cut Heuristic. In at least 38% of the tests the bid selection is optimal and the gap averages 1.926×10 −6 . Only in 4% of the cases, the solution could be improved and in the average there are only 4.65 PRBs leading to a potentially higher overall acceptance of clearing prices/decisions. The most important property of the algorithm however is its running time which averages to only 4.1 seconds. The maximum computing time was 1.1 minute and so clearing within the 10 minutes is easy possible. Moreover, due to being able to complete the process before the time limit is reached the results are reproducible on other machines 9 .
B&C Decomposition. The Branch-and-Cut Decomposition is slower than the Bid Cut Heuristic. However using it, we can prove optimality of a solution. It uses the solutions of the Bid Cut Heuristic as warm start solutions. In 38% of the cases the algorithm finishes in about 9 seconds. This implies that the found bid selection is optimal in at least 38% of the test. In the other cases the solver was stopped when reaching the time limit without proving optimality. During the computation 4% of the bid selections found by the Bid Cut Heuristic could be improved. This reduced the relative gap to 1.924×10 −6 and the number of PRBs was reduced to 4.62. The improvement which is not significant indicates that the solutions obtained via Bid Cut Heuristic are very good.
In Table 1 we summarize the results. More details about each instance can be found in Tables 2 and  3 . We can see, that the relative gaps of all algorithms have the same order of magnitude. The best solutions are found by the Branch-and-Bound Decomposition, but the relative gap cannot be reduced significantly. The fastest algorithm is the Bid Cut Heuristic, that finds very good bid selections in about 4 seconds.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our proposed approach works very well in practice and we were able to derive nice properties from the formulation as an optimization problem. A possible route for improvement is to replace the bid cut by an infeasibility cut of the generalized Benders decomposition (see Geoffrion [1972] , Chu and Xia 9 Reproducible prices are crucial for market transparency and confidence [2004] ). The main difficulty here is to find a non-trivial cut that is strong enough to work as fast as the bid cut. Otherwise the performance of the algorithm for day-ahead market clearing might not be sufficient enough. For example the simple no-good cut (cf. Definition 6.3) used for the Branch-and-Cut Decomposition is a valid Benders infeasibility cut, but the resulting algorithm is to slow. A nice additional consequence of the presented model are the transparent pricing rules. In fact, for a given bid selection optimality can be checked easily: A market participant could collect all relevant information to check the flow price condition. It is clear, that a solution will also satisfy the filling condition, so by applying theorem 4.1 the participant knows that the economic surplus is maximal for the actual bid selection. In this case the market is in an equilibrium. This transparency is crucial for market confidence and liquidity.
We want to mention, that the flow price condition is subject to change in the future. This is due to the fact that we made the assumption that no energy is lost during transmission. Unfortunately this assumptions is not realistic for some interconnectors. The loss of electricity, the so called deadband, has to be incorporated in the next model. This modification will alter the optimality conditions of the connectors that have a deadband.
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We would like to thank Herbert Nachbagauer and Adrian Krion for the insightful discussions, as well as the Deutsche Börse Systems Team for supporting us. We also would like to thank European Market Coupling Company for their cooperation and for providing us with invaluable data and information. We want to illustrate the difference between our nondiscriminatory prices and the discriminatory prices proposed in O'Neill et al. [2005] by analyzing the small example given in Table 4 . There are four indivisible orders in the market. Two supply orders (negative quantity) and two demand orders (positive quantity). Participant a is willing to sell one unit if he receives at least one euro, participant b is willing to buy one unit if the price is lower than two euros, and so forth. Solution A is the one that is proposed by O'Neill et al. [2005] whereas our market model would choose solution B.
In solution A there exists no linear price. This is the reason why it is suggested to divide the price into two parts. A variable payment depending on the quantity and a fixed payment. A negative payment indicates that the participant receives a payment. As every participant pays or receives an individual fixed payment we see that this is a discriminatory pricing scheme. Furthermore we observe, that no participant is realizing any gain in this solution. If we look at the total payments that the participants pay to the auctioneer or receive from the auctioneer we observe that the auctioneer keeps the entire economic surplus that was generated by the indivisible orders.
In solution B we simply do not execute the orders of participants a and b. This allows us to find linear prices, that are consistent with the dual prices that we know from the associated continuous optimization problems. The linear prices and the absence of a bid-ask spreads guarantee that the auctioneer cannot pocket any surplus. Indeed, the entire economic surplus is received by the participants. Proof of eq. (3.7). Suppose that there is no ramping on any interconnector. Then we have τ c = ∞ for all c ∈ C, so that with (3.5) and (3.6) it follows, that ρ c,t = ρ c,t = 0 for all c ∈ C and t ∈ T . Equation Proof of eq. (3.8). Suppose that there is ramping on the interconnector c ∈ Cand that the ramping condition (C 2) is only binding in the two consecutive time slots t and t + 1. Suppose further that there is still available transfer capacity in that time window. The available transfer capacity implies that τ c,t < τ c,t < τ c,t and τ c,t+1 < τ c,t+1 < τ c,t+1 , so that µ c,t = µ c,t = µ c,t+1 = µ c,t+1
= 0 follows using (3.3) and (3.4). We assume that the ramping condition is active only between hour t and t + 1, and that it is active in forward direction (see Figure These statements together provide −(π r,t −π s,t ) = − ρ c,t+1 = (π r,t+1 −π s,t+1 ), π r,t > π s,t , and π r,t+1 < π s,t+1 . We can now interpret the variables ρ as the shadow prices for ramping, in short the ramping prices. Here the economic surplus could by increased by ρ c,t+1 euros if the ramp rate would be increased by one unit (again on a sufficiently small interval).
Proof of eq. (3.9) and (3.10). See also [Müller, 2009, Theorem 4.4] . Let the flow-price pair (τ, π) satisfy the filling condition, let c = (r, s) ∈ C, t ∈ T , and π r,t < π s,t . Assume that τ c,t < τ c,t and = 0 which is a contradiction. Implication (3.10) can be proven in a similar fashion.
APPENDIX C. MIP FORMULATION OF THE FILLING CONDITION
The filling condition can be easily formulated using binary auxiliary variables. For every segment h ∈ H we introduce the binary variable γ h ∈ {0, 1}. Without loss of generality we assume that the segments are sorted at first by areas and hours, then by ascending prices, and finally by descending quantities. The filling condition can now be formulated like this:
Note that the presented algorithms do not rely on the inclusion of this condition. In fact, including it does not impede the solving process. The slowdown arises due to the inclusion of the filling condition combined with the price conditions of combinatorial bids. This is due to having also to formulate the flow price condition by using a complicated MIP formulation and this condition cannot be solved fast enough by standard solvers.
APPENDIX D. PRESOLVING
Before starting the optimization process, we can compute upper and lower bounds for the prices. For every area and hour we can determine the intersection of the hourly net curve with the price axis. This price would be the clearing price if no block bid would be executed and no power would be imported or exported. Now we assume that we have to import as much additional power as possible and that all supply block bids are executed. The additional power must be bought by hourly bids, thus the price decreases along the hourly net curve until all additional power is consumed by hourly bids. This price represents a lower bound for the specific area and hour. Upper bounds can be determined similarly.
Formula (D.1) is directly derived from the clearing constraint (C 1) and shows the upper and lower quantity bounds of the hourly net curves. The price bounds can be derived from these quantity bounds. With the help of these bounds the execution state of the blocks and hourly bids that always realize a gain or incur a loss is given. The bounds can also be used to cut off infeasible classes of bid selections in the branch-and-cut tree. We implemented theses techniques, but unfortunately the solving process could not be enhanced significantly.
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